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The AKP government, in power since 2002, has 
long benefited from the unconditional and valu-
able support of Fethullah Gülen’s sphere of in-
fluence, which stretches across many domains. 
This influence is most notable in domestic poli-
cy, where his media network has supported the 
government’s efforts to democratize the state 
and its institutions, contain the political role of 
the military, and advance Turkey’s EU candida-
cy. Their cordial entente was equally, if not more, 
effective in foreign policy. This is particularly the 
case in Central Asia and South Caucasus, where 
the AKP and Gülen have spoken with one voice 
to establish the cultural, economic, and political 
influence of Turkey. This cooperation was all the 
more harmonious due to the fact that from a 
sociological point of view, the AKP and Gülen 
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Key points 
 
In Central Asia and South Caucasus the 
AKP and Gülen have spoken with one 
voice to establish Turkey’s cultural, 
economic, and political influence.  
 
Both time and energy will be needed 
for Gülen’s representatives to prove to 
their Central Asian and Azerbaijani 
partners that their local objectives have 
nothing in common with the one they 
pursue in Turkey.      
 
The current crisis could awaken the 
suspicion and mistrust of public opin-
ion as well as local authorities in Cen-
tral Asia and Azerbaijan, and stigmatize 
the students and graduates of Gülen 
schools. 
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share the same social base. However, on Decem-
ber 17, 2013, after having traversed several cri-
ses both in foreign and domestic policy, this alli-
ance imploded.1 The divorce between the two 
most influential politico-religious leaders in Tur-
key affects the entire Turkish political system, as 
well as Ankara’s foreign policy, insofar as Gülen’s 
sphere of influence alone incarnates an essential 
part of Turkish soft power. This crisis concerns 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, since it occupies 
an important place in Ankara’s policies and the 
actions of Gülen’s network, whose oldest and 
strongest presence outside of Anatolian borders 
is located there. The crisis of confidence between 
Gülen and the AKP raises several questions re-
garding Turkey’s relationship with Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, where a number of Gülenist 
schools have developed.  
 
Several questions emerge: In what way does the 
crisis affect the post-Soviet sphere and change 
Turkish foreign policy in the region? More fun-
damentally, how will the societies and regimes of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus regard the schools 
of Fethullah Gülen and the intentions, political or 
otherwise, of the cohorts of graduates who have 
joined the ranks of local and national elites? An-
swering these questions will involve a brief 
summary of Turkish policy in the former Soviet 
space and the place that Gülen’s network occu-
pies in this policy. 
 
Gülen’s network at the service of Turkey’s 
soft power 
 
In order to better understand the importance of 
Gülen’s network in Central Asia, one must recall 
that Turkey was one of the countries most inter-
ested in this new geopolitical space inhabited 
primarily by populations whose language, cul-
ture, and religion were close to those of Turkey.2 
First to recognize their independence, Turkey 
began an ambitious and unrealistic policy—
ultimate goal of which was to form a sort of Tur-
kic bloc capable of weighing in on the interna-
tional scene.3 However, after a first phase of rela-
tive success, realism prevailed; Ankara realized 
that it did not have the means to achieve such 
ambitions. In addition, it soon became clear that 
the post-Soviet republics had little desire to see 
Turkey become a new big brother that would 
limit their newly acquired independence. Turk-
ish policy in Central Asia thus rapidly became 
more the work of private actors who proved 
themselves to be more effective than the state in 
their strategies of adapting to the new realities. 
Among these actors, the most influential and 
multidimensional was the Gülenist network, 
which was the de facto spearhead of Turkey’s 
policy in these countries.  
 
Describing Fethullah Gülen’s network as a 
‘movement’ hardly suffices to describe an organ-
ization that, although visible, has no clear 
boundaries and whose identity is of variable 
geometry. At first it might have been described 
as a power nebula. Strategic secrecy and opacity4 
were privileged in order to remain elusive, as 
much in its identity and activities as in its inten-
tions. Its own members define their movement 
as hizmet, which is to say a community organized 
around ‘service’ rendered to individuals, the 
community, and all humanity through education 
and the dialogue between religions and cultures.5 
In Central Asia and the Caucasus, Gülen’s net-
work has established itself in various sectors, 
especially in education by developing and run-
ning schools and centers of higher learning oper-
ated by expatriate Anatolian Turks who find a 
moral and ethical justification for their economic, 
and cultural action in the teachings of Gülen. 
 
 
The first Gülenist establishments appeared in 
1992. In general businessmen, education profes-
sionals, and journalists who shared Gülen’s ideas 
to differing degrees moved into these countries 
to make connections and rapidly create schools 
and commercial operations. The context of the 
time was favorable. The collapsing national edu-
cational systems lacked the means to meet the 
demands of openness and globalization. Diplo-
matic relations with Turkey were excellent due 
to the prestige and natural sympathy derived 
from the common heritage of history, language, 
religion, and Turkic culture. For these reasons, 
Gülen’s network encountered very few obstacles 
Turkish businessmen, education profes-
sionals, and journalists who shared Gü-
len’s ideas to differing degrees moved into 
the post-Soviet countries to make connec-
tions and rapidly create schools and com-
mercial operations. 
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in its massive implantation. Soon dozens of 
schools opened to train new elites who were 
more internationally oriented.6 They were par-
tially financed by a network of Turkish small 
businesses whose mission was to fill out and 
develop the social and economic landscapes in 
these new lands.  
 
The zenith of good relations between these 
schools and the post-Soviet countries occurred in 
1999. Kazakhstan boasted thirty schools and a 
university; Kyrgyzstan, fifteen schools and a uni-
versity; Uzbekistan, sixteen high schools and an 
international school, the Ulugbek International 
School; Tajikistan, six schools; and Turkmeni-
stan, ten schools and a university. In the South 
Caucasus, there were five schools and one uni-
versity in Georgia as well as fifteen schools, a 
university, and nearly twenty preparatory 
schools in Azerbaijan. These educational estab-
lishments were supplemented with the circula-
tion and influence of the Gülenist daily newspa-
per, Zaman, which appeared in the local lan-
guages in all of these countries except Georgia 
and Tajikistan.7 Gülenist schools also flourished 
in the Russian Federation at the beginning of the 
1990s. 
 
Two decades have since passed. These schools 
have trained the first post-Soviet generation and 
most of them continue to operate. They still have 
the same status, that of private schools working 
under the authority of the Minister of Education, 
in each country. They respect, to the letter, na-
tional programs in conformity with local norms, 
notably in terms of secularism.  
 
However, in two countries, these schools have 
had to close entirely, or maintain only a symbolic 
presence. In Uzbekistan, the local authorities 
decided to close them in 2000, after having 
closed some of them as early as 1995. The rea-
sons for their prohibition are diverse and must 
be situated in the general context of the deterio-
ration of relations between Turkey and Uzbeki-
stan. Relations suffered when Turkey offered 
asylum to several members of the Uzbek political 
opposition suspected of engaging in subversive 
activities with Ankara's support.8 As for Turk-
menistan, the local authorities greatly appreciat-
ed the schools, not only under Saparmurat Ni-
yazov, but also during the early years of his suc-
cessor Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov.9 Howev-
er, in 2010-11, the government decided to ab-
sorb most of the Turkish schools into the nation-
al system and maintain just two independent 
establishments, the Turgut Özal School in Ash-
gabat and the International Turkmen Turkish 
University. The decision and its application are 
part of a framework negotiated between the two 
parties. It is in no way the result of a crisis com-
parable to the one that accompanied the closing 
of the Turkish schools in Uzbekistan.  
 
 
In every country in which they are established, 
the Gülen schools dispense a secular education in 
conformity with host country authorities, which 
watch over them closely. The difference between 
these schools and their public equivalents re-
sides in the fact that the Turkish schools, rarely 
identified as Gülenist, offer a modern, multilin-
gual education that responds to the need for 
openness and the training of new elites. English 
is a priority, but local languages, Russian, and 
Turkish, also figure in the coursework. Scientific 
disciplines are privileged and the ultimate goal is 
to give students the best chances of entering the 
universities in Turkey and in the West. The ad-
mission selection process is difficult and the 
schools recruit from the privileged layers of host 
society, including political elite’s children. To 
reinforce their status, the schools rigorously re-
spect the legal framework of the host countries 
and participate in the legitimization process of 
the regimes in power by supporting government 
policies and inculcating obedience and loyalty in 
students. 
 
Contrary to a common preconception, these 
schools are not disguised madrasas dispensing 
an Islamic education or extolling the ideas of 
Gülen. They do not offer Islamic classes; howev-
er, a certain religious activism was practiced 
outside of classes during the first years they 
were in place. The risks this activism posed to 
The Gülen schools dispense a secular edu-
cation in conformity with host country 
authorities, which watch over them close-
ly. Contrary to a common preconception, 
these schools are not disguised madrasas 
dispensing an Islamic education or extol-
ling the ideas of Gülen. 
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the larger-scale activities of the movement led to 
the abandonment of any extra-curricular reli-
gious education in order to avoid criticism and 
accusations of Islamic proselytism.     
 
On the other hand, without actively or visibly 
proselytizing, the Gülen movement transmits a 
certain Islamic and universalist ethic to its pu-
pils. The value of work, respect and tolerance of 
the other, cleanliness as well as mental and phys-
ical hygiene, politeness, courtesy and good man-
ners or the edep of the societies of the Muslim 
Middle East are applied, lived, and incarnated 
every day by every Gülenist teacher—and spread 
to the students through identification and admi-
ration. They follow the model of Christian mis-
sionary schools, implanted in Turkey at the end 
of the Ottoman era, which trained a large num-
ber of Turkish republican elites and adopted a 
more secular model in order to survive in the 
context of Ataturk’s revolution. The Gülen 
schools are strongly inspired by the European 
Christian model, not to Islamize but to establish a 
certain Turkish soft power that benefits, indi-
rectly and over the long term, from the spread of 
an Islamic ethics without proselytism.  
 
Gülen’s approach seduced and earned the sup-
port of Turkish diplomatic circles, even at a time, 
the 1990s, when the relationship between the 
movement and the Turkish state was difficult. 
Following the advice of Turgut Özal, who per-
sonally supported the opening of Gülen schools 
in the post-Soviet space, the Turkish diplomatic 
circles saw in them a means of spreading Turkish 
cultural influence over the medium and long 
term. In so doing, they incited their Uzbek, Ka-
zakh, Turkmen, and other counterparts to accept 
Gülen schools and facilitate their establishment.  
 
However, the tide soon began to change, first in 
Uzbekistan and then in the other countries of the 
region. Incidentally this change in attitude coin-
cided with the arrival in power of the AKP in 
2002. In Russia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan 
the authorities began to wonder if the presence 
of Turkish schools, whose affiliation with a con-
servative network was becoming increasingly 
visible, did not risk favoring, in the long term, the 
development of political Islam—not to mention 
bringing conservatives preaching a moderate 
political Islam to power in Bishkek or Baku.10 It 
did not escape them that Gülen’s network and 
the AKP were very close and generally shared 
the same social base, namely the rising conserva-
tive layers of Anatolian society.  
 
Which future for the Gülenist schools?  
 
Since December 17, 2013, the alliance between 
Gülen and Erdoğan has not only imploded, but 
the two rivals also have begun a global settle-
ment of scores affecting Gülenist foreign assets. 
In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the crisis un-
veiled the amplitude of the concealed political 
agenda of Gülen schools, one capable of endan-
gering the democratically elected regime of the 
charismatic Erdoğan, who has been comfortably 
in power for over ten years. The infiltration of 
Gülenists into the police and justice systems 
doubtless led some regimes in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus to question the right of the schools 
to operate freely in their countries.    
 
The crisis revealed the movement’s political ul-
terior motives and his implantation in state 
structures in Turkey. Whatever its real political 
objective may be, the amplitude of the means 
deployed to attain this objective—notably the 
infiltration of the police and justice systems as 
well as the use of illegal phone taps, practiced 
widely if one believes the Turkish media11—are 
enough to show the determination of Gülen’s 
movement. At this point, the Central Asian and 
South Caucasian regimes are confronted with 
two major questions: whether Gülen’s network 
has the same power to harm them over the me-
dium or long term, and whether it intends to use 
this power against the regimes in place. Conse-
quent questions include how these regimes 
would react and how Turkish diplomacy would 
respond. 
 
It is difficult to answer the first two questions, as 
it would necessitate an investigation combining 
both police and intelligence work. That said, the 
network does not have the same influence eve-
rywhere. In Uzbekistan, for example, almost 
nothing remains of its influence. In Turkmeni-
stan, the schools managed to train hundreds, 
even thousands of students over the fifteen years 
that they existed. In Azerbaijan, Gülen’s network 
is still quite active and influential. In this sense, 
the movement’s weight varies from one context 
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to another and one can doubt its power to influ-
ence local politics, with the notable exception of 
Azerbaijan. In any case, Gülen’s representatives 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus cannot risk in-
terfering, and do not even have the means to do 
so. 
 
Each Gülen project should be placed in the con-
text of the movement’s broader strategy. In Cen-
tral Asia and South Caucasus, the objectives are 
purely educational and cultural. The goal is to 
train professionals who will create cultural 
bridges between their home countries and Tur-
key. They contribute to create a positive image 
for the movement, increase its international 
prestige, and reinforce its influence in Turkey. 
One should not forget that without the alliance 
and the support of the AKP, Gülen’s disciples 
would have never attained such a level of collu-
sion and infiltration in the Turkish government. 
In other terms, Erdoğan opened Pandora’s box 
by making Gülen a special ally in his fight against 
Kemalist forces and quest for regional leader-
ship. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, Gülen’s 
network is not allied with any political actor. It 
remains restricted to its primary role, that of 
schoolmaster. 
 
And yet Gülen’s network risks suffering in Cen-
tral Asia and the Caucasus from what is happen-
ing in Turkey. Its image and perceptions have 
been tarnished by the scandals of infiltration and 
political denunciation. The local regimes, already 
suspicious of the schools, will no longer regard 
Gülenists the same way and will increase their 
vigilance. One country, Azerbaijan, has already 
started to take concrete measures against Gülen-
ist networks. The authorities have changed the 
status of the Gülen schools and a member of the 
presidential apparatus allegedly linked to the 
movement was fired.12 . Just after the local elec-
tions in Turkey Erdoğan paid a visit to Baku, and 
his trip was dominated by the Gülen issue in 
Azerbaijan.13 In the other countries, this per-
verse boomerang effect could awaken the suspi-
cion and mistrust of public opinion as well as 
local authorities, and stigmatize the students and 
graduates of Gülen schools.  
 
Despite ten years of AKP power, Turkish diplo-
macy remains globally secular and Kemalist. Out 
of pragmatism but not without hesitation, it 
vouched for and provided moral support to the 
educational activities of the hizmet movement. 
However, now that Prime Minister Erdoğan has 
compared the movement to the Assassin sect14 
and asked during the annual conference of Turk-
ish ambassadors that the ‘misdeeds’ of this or-
ganization be broadcast and explained around 
the world,15 the schools can no longer count on 
the moral support of the Turkish state. It is cer-
tain that all of the diplomats will not apply to the 
letter the instructions of the prime minister. Still, 
seeing the Erdoğan-Gülen split splashed across 
all global media suffices to complicate the 
schools’ task in the post-Soviet area and beyond.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The confrontation between Turkish Prime Minis-
ter Recep Tayip Erdoğan and the network of Fe-
thullah Gülen is so far limited to the Turkish po-
litical sphere. The political map is being com-
pletely redrawn by this battle, one which will not 
calm down until the municipal and presidential 
elections in March and August 2014, if ever. This 
battle, of vital importance for both camps, will 
certainly continue abroad, with Central Asia and 
the Caucasus at its epicenter, since it is in this 
sphere that Gülen’s network is best established.  
 
However, the real threat for the network is not 
being attacked by the Turkish government in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, but being consid-
ered dangerous by the local governments. Gü-
len’s network has neither the intention (except 
possibly in Azerbaijan) nor the power to engage 
in local political struggles. Nonetheless, whether 
or not it nurses such an ambition, the Central 
Asian and Caucasian regimes likely believe it to 
be capable of as much. Whatever its future ca-
pacities and intentions might be, Gülen’s net-
work has already lost part of its credibility in 
these countries. Its strength arouses surprise but 
Now that Erdoğan has compared the 
movement to the Assassin sect and asked 
during the annual conference of Turkish 
ambassadors that the ‘misdeeds’ of this 
organization be broadcast and explained 
around the world, the schools can no long-
er count on the moral support of the Turk-
ish state. 
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also mistrust, because it no longer has the means 
to hide its political objectives and its infiltration 
capacity in Turkey. Both time and energy will be 
needed for Gülen’s representatives to prove to 
their Central Asian and Azerbaijani partners that 
their local objectives have nothing in common 
with the one they pursue in Turkey.      
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